THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

No. 11. FEBRUARY, 1941. Vol. XXX.

SIGNS OF THE TIMES

The Government of God.

When in the first half of the fifth century of this era the Roman Empire was being broken up under the pressure of the Barbarians, two notable books of religion were produced as the outcome of it—*The Government of God* (*De Gubernatione Dei*) by Salvian, the presbyter, and *The City of God* (*De Civitate Dei*) by St. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. They were directed to teaching the lesson that amid the horrors and disasters of this overwhelming conflict, in which both civilization and the Christian religion were threatened with extermination, it was possible to see the operation of the Divine Government of the world. Salvian, 'the Master of Bishops' (*episcoporum magister*), regarded the disasters as the divine punishment of the wickedness and folly of the age, and particularly the wickedness and folly of the Christians, who ought to have been the salt and light of the Roman Empire but were lower in their standards of conduct and character than the Pagan citizens whom they had replaced. Salvian's book is little known in religious circles to-day. It was too terrible in its condemnation of contemporary Christianity and too negative in its outlook to be 'a cordial for drooping spirits.'

In any case, an indictment which pointed to the Christian Church as the worst of offenders was hardly likely to be popular in Church circles. St. Augustine's book, on the other hand, is an extraordinary example of Christian creative thought. It is as laboriously constructed as it is resolutely optimistic. Its influence for good and ill was immense. It shaped the whole policy, ecclesiastical and political, of Western Europe for centuries afterwards. Augustine saw in the disasters of his age that God was working out a plan by which the Divine Government should replace the crimes and follies of human administrations.

The horrors of our present age have created a similar need for guidance which directs attention to the spiritual issues of the war and seeks to strengthen men's faith in the Divine Government of the world and encourages them to co-operate with it to the best of their insight and ability. We make no attempt here to catalogue the religious literature produced by the war. No Augustine has yet appeared, and were he to do so in a treatise of twenty-two books few would read him in an age of booklets, pamphlets and magazine articles. The pulpit has tried hard to deal with such problems, but only a small percentage of our population elects to attend church. The wireless has done a great deal more in transmitting religious direction in this crisis. We are glad to observe that the Daily Press is emulating the wireless. The example was set by the *Times*. The latest instance of this religious use of the Press is seen in the carefully prepared newspaper discussion in the *News Chronicle*.

The discussion, entitled 'God and the War,' was opened by J. B. Priestly, who maintains that one cause of the present mess is due to something having happened to our religion — we had muddled it and lost it. Yet there is a deep and widespread need, felt and unfelt, for the Christian religion in all its essential simplicities and realities. He writes :

> 'I am convinced that a lack of religious belief has helped to push us all into this black-out. . . . Jung, the most profound of the psychoanalysts, has declared that religious myths and symbols are like strong-points guarding the frontier of a man's conscious mind from the sudden dark invasions of the collective unconscious, which may produce madness. Strictly speaking, a great many people now *are* mad, although they may not be in lunatic asylums. Many of the Nazis are mad. They have fallen victims to the dark unconscious.'

This idea of general madness is no new notion of Mr. Priestley. Bishop Butler in the eighteenth century discussed seriously whether a whole generation of mankind might not go mad, and arrived at the melancholy conclusion that it was quite possible.

The next contribution, by Canon Marriott of Westminster, rightly varies the length of the bowling. It is pastoral and personal. He discusses the problem of war prayers. Prayers for our loved ones in danger, whether uttered by English or Germans, we may believe, equally receive their answer in accordance with the compassion and wisdom of God. German and English prayers for victory come into a very different category. The answer cannot be the same for both parties. 'Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?'

Dr. Maude Royden contributes the third article, entitled 'What have I done to deserve this?' It appears that the question really ought to be in our case, 'What have I not done to deserve this?' It was the failure to do the right thing after we had been granted victory in the Great War, and to keep on doing it, which has been the main cause of our troubles. Our intentions were good enough, but we lacked wisdom and moral courage. We thought that peace could be maintained without our being perpetually prepared for war and sternly resolved to go to war whenever and wherever treaties were broken. Our political leaders, we may hope, have learnt this lesson, and even a certain number of our less prejudiced pacifists. When personal disasters befall us in the war we should all be glad to emulate the spirit of the woman who remarked, as she gazed on the ruins of her bombed home, 'Well, if it hadn't been my home it would have been the home of some other poor dear.'

The next contributor in the succession, Olaf Stapledon, goes to the heart of the problem :

> 'With the decline of Christianity something faded out of Western civilization. A vitalizing and restraining influence was withdrawn. We must not and cannot go back to Christianity, at least not to Christian orthodoxy ; but something very like the Christian spirit at its best we do now most desperately need.
>
> Somehow we have to practise a Communism that is Christian in spirit, and a Christianity that is Communist in action. But the word "Christian" is now so ambiguous and debased that perhaps we had better avoid it. If "Christianity" is a system of doctrines and institu-

tions, we must have none of it. Such religion is indeed "the opium of the people." But if by "Christianity" you mean a certain quality of experience which is the source not only of those doctrines and institutions, but also of all fully humane living in all ages and countries, then certainly what we need is Christianity.'

To put it quite shortly, what we need to-day in our personal, social, national and international life is loyalty to the Spirit of Christ and to those few profound and universal simplicities of religious faith which generate and nourish that Spirit. Loyalty to Christ, rather than loyalty to Christianity. And the urgent question for many is whether for the sake of mankind, the Christian Churches are going to free themselves and their activities from the entangling ecclesiastical red tape with which they are tied? We need a Universal Church whose essential creed is the Lord's Prayer, and its standard of practice the Two Great Commandments. But where is the Pope or Primate, the President or Moderator, who has the courage to lead in this crusade?

In the *Times* the correspondence is not seldom of a quality superior to that of the articles. In the *News Chronicle* the correspondence, arising out of the contributed articles in this series, serves only to emphasize the urgent need for Christian leadership and religious education.

The Reunion Roundabout.

The New York *Churchman* of January 1 publishes a significant article by Robert S. Lambert, one of the delegates to the biennial meeting of the Federated Council of Churches in the U.S.A. The article is entitled 'Can we have a United Church?' This Reunion business has been so prolonged that it has ceased to have any real interest for the general public and to-day arouses only the most languid attention from the vast bulk of practising Christians. As the result of reunion negotiations extending over more than half a century certain clear conclusions have emerged.

1. That in all efforts of this kind the Church of Rome can have no place: not because others desire her exclusion, but because she can only conscientiously unite with those who are willing to submit to her absolute and infallible authority in matters of faith and order.

2. That the various Reformed Churches, excluding the Church of England, while freely practising intercommunion and interchange of pulpits among themselves and willing to extend this fraternal practice to Anglicans, are not prepared for organic union nor to accept an episcopally ordained ministry as a prerequisite for it.

3. That the Anglican Communion is, in this matter of Christian Reunion, a house divided against itself. The great majority of Anglicans would welcome to their altars communicant members of all Christian Churches and would gladly listen occasionally to their ministers as an interesting relief from the monotony of the vicar's sermons. On the other hand, there is a very unyielding and influential body of Anglicans who are strongly opposed to these fraternal practices and are unable to accept the ministrations of any clergy except those ordained by bishops possessed of the Apostolic Succesion.

4. That the Orthodox Churches of the Middle East and Russia, whilst deeply apprehensive of Roman propaganda, are quite friendly to all the Reformed Churches that are friendly to them — particularly to the Church of England — and are prepared for intercommunion with them provided they can give assurances that they accept the Orthodox doctrinal tradition.

The situation looks like a deadlock — a deadlock produced by loyalty to convictions and also loyalty to one's own beloved spiritual home. Reasonable Christian men do not feel that they can demand that their fellow-Christians belonging to other Christian denominations should sacrifice these denominational loyalties. They are therefore forced to the conclusion that genuine and fruitful Christian reunion must permit the free exercise of these denominational loyalties within the greater Christian unity which is desired. Of course a growing Christian experience, a widening Christian outlook, and a far more thorough and modern system of Christian education, might, and certainly would in many cases, lead in time to the surrender of these denominational loyalties in response to the ideal of one free universal Church in which Anglican and Presbyterian, Methodist and Congregationalist, Unitarian and Quaker, Lutheran and Calvinist, Greek Orthodox and Old Catholic

would naturally and happily dwell together in one great spiritual home. But such a process, we regret to think, is not likely to reach its culmination in the very near future unless the most dramatic happenings in the political, economic, social and intellectual world of the Church's environment hasten and consummate this centripetal movement.

> 'For East is East, and West is West,
> And never the twain shall meet
> Till East and West meet suddenly
> At God's great judgment seat.'

Mr. Lambert is right when he concludes that the time is past for the use of what he calls 'stop-gap methods,' 'artificial cure-alls' and 'pious concordats' as providing a sound and final solution to our unhappy divisions. He is also right when he concludes that

> 'different kinds of worship, and perhaps divergent theological formulae, are not in themselves faulty, but that where the Gospel stops in the bigoted and narrow interpretation of either one, there lie the obstacles to Christian unity and progress toward the Kingdom of God.'

Clearly, as Fr. Gerald Vann, O.P. of the 'Fellowship of Reconciliation,' affirmed in a paper recently read before a meeting of that Society:

> 'Too often, when we should be collaborating together in the full strength of all we hold in common, collaborating to defend at all costs the things that are most fundamental, most essential to human life, we find ourselves, on the contrary, wasting our energies, and causing scandal to non-Christians, by bickering among ourselves. If we do that, we are not merely fiddling while Rome burns: we are fanning the flames. There is no problem more terribly urgent than the problem of the unity of Christendom. Clearly, the problem cannot be solved in a day. But there is much that can be done, and ought to be done, at once.'

Let there be no mistake. Rome does desire the reunion of Christendom; but her conscientious absolutism, as uncompromising in its own sphere as that of Nazism in the third Reich, precludes her co-operating with the other Christian Churches. Is there no way by which her leaders, possessed of enlightenment, Christian charity, and an acute realization of the tremendous urgency of the need, can take a full share in these strivings for the achievement of Christian unity, without demanding as a preliminary, absolute surrender to the Papacy? 'Whosoever would be first among you, let him be servant of all' (*Mk.* x, 44). Thus only can Christian primacy be attained and maintained.

Roman Catholic Liberalism in China.

The International Review of Missions for January 1941, in an Appendix dealing with Roman Catholic Missions, notes the recent concessions made in China by the Roman Catholic authorities to Confucianism and reverence for the dead.

> 'The most outstanding action of the Roman Catholic Church in China during the period under review was the publication on December 8th, 1939, by the Sacred Congregation of the Propaganda, of *An instruction regarding certain ceremonies and the oath on Chinese rites*. The Instruction was concerned with ceremonies performed in honour of Confucius, and brought the declared policy of the Church into line with that regarding Christian attendance at Shinto shrines. It states that "it is not to be considered illicit" to place in Roman Catholic schools a likeness of Confucius, or a tablet inscribed with his name, or to bow before it: and "it is to be tolerated" that attendance at and passive participation in public Confucian ceremonies should take place. Bowing "and other signs of civil respect" before the dead, or their images, or a tablet inscribed with their names, "are also to be considered licit and proper." In all this there is the proviso that the intention of the Christian should be "solely for the purpose of promoting and expressing the honour due to a great man and proper regard for tradition."
>
> The Oath on Chinese Rites, first demanded of all priests in China by Pope Benedict XIV in 1742, has been required ever since as an essential preliminary to their service. The Instruction declared that it is not now "entirely consonant with recent norms" laid down by the Sacred Congregation, and, together with the old controversies about the Rites which gave rise to it, has become obsolete and is to be dispensed with' (p. 126).

This concession seems to us to be as Christian in its spirit as it is judicious in its policy. There is no real conflict between profound reverence for the personality and teaching of the greatest of China's sages and loyalty to Christ. The same is true of the hereditary reverence which the Chinese are taught to show to their ancestral dead. China's social stability is built upon these reverences, and the function of the Chinese religion in such a case is not to destroy but to fulfil. A Quaker poet wrote:

> 'The prophets of the elder day,
> The slant-eyed sages of Cathay,
> Read not the riddle all amiss
> Of higher life evolved from this;
> Nor doth it lessen what He taught
> Nor make the Gospel Jesus brought
> Less precious that His lips retold
> Some portion of that truth of old.'
>
> (Whittier's *Miriam*.)

We have felt that another Christian concession of quite a different kind ought to be made in the case of polygamist converts to Christianity. At present, before admission to the Christian Church, such polygamist converts are required to give up all their wives except one. This is a great hardship for the wives, and seems to us to conflict with the spirit which inspires our Lord's teaching about marriage. While we are quite clear that Christians may only be permitted to practise marriage as a monogamous life-long union, we think that in the case of polygamist converts the divorce of all their wives except one should not be required of them as a condition of entrance to the Christian Church. When may we hope that the leaders of our Christian Missions will make this concession?

Two Great Headmasters and National Education.

In the *Fortnightly Review* for January 1941, Sir Cyril Norwood, in an important article entitled 'Some Aspects of Educational Reconstruction,' reminds his readers that our two English Archbishops, Cardinal Hinsley, and the representative of the Free Churches signed a letter published in *The Times* of December 21, 1940, in which they laid down that

> 'every child, regardless of race or class, should have equal opportunities of education suitable for the development of his peculiar capacities.'

Dr. Norwood accepts this as a basic principle in our future educational policy. But no child really has his chance if his educational curriculum omits the Christian religion. The individual needs that religion as much as our nation and the world need it, but that need must begin to be supplied in the education of each child in his school days. Hence Dr. Norwood maintains that in schools of every type the Christian religion should be competently taught, and that special emphasis should be laid on its moral and spiritual duties: that prayers should be said daily, and that there should be one day in the year set apart for commemoration and dedication in inspiring surroundings.

As Dr. Norwood looks forward to a national educational course which will not culminate before the eighteenth year of the scholar, it should be possible to provide a quality of religious training which will not be of that childish character which fails

to retain the loyalty of the adult. We may mention, by the way, that the last stage of this national educational system would consist of six months' unpaid national service in the Army, Navy, or Air Force, or on the land in drainage, reclamation, or forestry.

Dr. David, in our Church newspapers where it is most needed, has been pressing the claims of a new method of religious education for the young. This new method, by avoiding dogmatic and denominational differences between Christians, ought to be acceptable to all Christians who favour the religious education of their children in our national schools. In a letter to the *Guardian* of January 31, Dr. David thus describes it:

> 'It approaches the subject from the point of view, not of the theologian, but of the child. It gives him the truths of Christianity in a form which he can assimilate. It presents him with material he can use at once, without waiting "till he is older and can understand." It supplies him with young ideas, which can live in him and grow with him. It is the business of the Churches to see that they do grow later on into full dogmatic form. Anyone who reads a little book by Miss Phyllis Dent, called *Teaching Doctrine* (National Society, 1*s*.), will see at once how different is this from simple Bible-teaching. It seems to me much nearer to Father Drinkwater's concentric method. Anyhow, it has proved its worth in this country, and all our best teachers are using it. When this is realized, the old battle-cries will have lost all significance, and the champions of either side can press forward together towards true and effective Christian teaching at least in all our elementary schools.'

Dr. David further explained this point in a letter to the *Church Times* of January 31:

> 'The new conception of "elements," long since applied to other subjects, is now being used in the teaching of religion. It has created a preparatory stage, on which the Churches can build their own full doctrinal instruction later on, when the child is able to receive it. Thus the whole question is taken out of the reach of theological dissension, and is set where it can be handled by practical teachers in peace.'

It is to be hoped that the N.U.T., which has stood resolutely for the conscientious rights of teachers as against control by our ecclesiastical authorities, will find themselves able to give their support to these proposals.

THE JET OF LIFE

By W. Richardson, M.A., Chaplain and Tutor of Ripon Hall.

IF one were to consult the *Modern Churchman* for May and June, 1931, one would find that a great controversy was raging as to the significance and value of the philosophy of Henri Bergson. In 1907 there had appeared Bergson's first great book *Creative Evolution*, and Bergson had been hailed as the apostle of new light, the prophet of a new age in philosophy. Students and scholars thronged his lecture-rooms, and there followed the further volumes *Matter and Memory*, *Time and Free Will*, and finally in 1932, in less palmy days, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*. By this time Bergson's star was no longer in the ascendant. His had been called 'the Light that Failed,' and on his death in January, 1941, *The Times Literary Supplement* described him as 'a Philosopher in Eclipse.'

The main strand of Bergson's philosophy was his theory of the *élan vital*, the Jet of Life. For his interpretation of things Bergson sought light from Biology, which could claim to be as much an element in reality as the objects of Physics, the mechanistic and deterministic outlook of which was predominant at the time. Bergson insisted on concentrating on the aspect of growth. He insisted on looking at things, as it were, from within rather than from without. He would live with them as they grew in the course of evolution. He would look from the living present into the developing future rather than back on the dead past. The *élan vital*, the life-force, then appears clearly as the dominant element in the universe, and that force works by no fortuitous, mechanistic and blind adaptation alone; rather it is a cosmic intelligence governing and directing matter. Time is to be regarded not as clock-time, equal periods neatly divided and following each other continually, but from the point of view of time as it flows through a subject in time. This is for Bergson 'real duration,' and the other, clock-time, is an abstraction. As a result the problem of free-will ceases to be a problem of mechanistic forces at war in the soul, as it appears when we look back on a moral struggle. Rather, willing is a description of the

forward-spurt of the Jet of Life in a man into a future undetermined by final or physical causation. Consistently with his rebellion against the methods of Logic and Physics, Bergson held that the true philosophical method was by intuition.

As Bergson was not unnaturally sharply attacked not only for his alleged irrationalism but also on religious grounds, a brief examination of his latest book, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, would perhaps be the best tribute to his memory. On pp. 91 *ff.* of the translation of that book by R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton, Bergson gives a brief synopsis of his theory of Creative Evolution, in regard to which he says he was 'keeping as close as he could to actual experience.' He held that the phenomena of life could not be resolved into physical and chemical facts. Evolution could not be explained by a series of accidental variations preserved by selection and fixed by heredity, and it is alleged that this is not supported by the facts. 'The evolution of life occurred in certain definite directions' (p. 92). These directions are not to be explained by the heredity of acquired characteristics which Bergson rejected, nor by the mechanical action of external causes, but by

> 'an inward impulse that passes from germ to germ through individuals, that carries life in a given direction, towards an ever higher complexity' (p. 93).

But if the adaptation and purpose in life are not to be explained by mechanical causes, neither are they by final causes. Bergson vindicates our freedom not less against Calvin than Darwin. Intuition from within would see what appeared to be mechanical causation and accidental combination from without as really the overcoming of resistance from within. Bergson gives the example of an invisible hand thrust through a heap of iron-filings. It would seem merely to brush aside the resistance it met, but

> 'from the point of view of the resistance this would appear as an alignment, made in a deliberate order, of the filings themselves' (p. 94).

So

> 'if life cannot be resolved into physical and chemical facts, it operates in the manner of a special cause, added on to what we ordinarily call matter, matter in this case being both an instrument and an obstacle. It divides what it defines. We may conjecture that a division of this kind is responsible for the multiplicity of the great lines of vital evolution . . . If we see two or three big lines of evolution running freely forward, alongside other lines which end in a blind road, and if along each of these lines an essential characteristic develops more and more, we may conjecture that the vital impulse began by possessing

these characteristics in a state of reciprocal implication: instinct and intelligence, which reach their culminating point at the extremities of the two principal lines of animal evolution, must therefore be taken one with the other, before their separation; not combined into one, but one in the beginning, instinct and intelligence being then mere views, taken from two different points, of that simple reality . . . Whether you embrace the doctrine of pure mechanism or that of pure finality, in either case the creations of life are supposed to be predetermined, the future being deducible from the present by a calculation, and designed within it as an idea, time being thus unavailing. Pure experience suggests nothing of the sort. "Neither impulsion nor attraction" seems to be its motto. Now it is just something of this kind that an impetus can suggest, whilst it can also, by the indivisibility of what is felt internally and the divisibility to infinity of what is externally perceived, give the idea of that real and effective duration which is the essential attribute of life' (pp. 94-5).

From this background we can go on to examine briefly the salient points of Bergson's views on morals and religion. His ruling idea is the opposition between what he calls open and closed society, morality and souls, and between static and dynamic religion. He holds that

'Instinct and intelligence have each as their essential object the utilization of implements; in the one case, invented tools, and therefore varied and unforeseen; in the other, organs supplied by nature and hence immutable. The implement is, moreover, designed for a certain type of work, and this work is all the more efficient, the more it is specialised, the more it is divided up between diversely qualified workers who mutually supplement one another. Social life is thus immanent, like a vague ideal, in instinct as well as in intelligence; this ideal finds its most complete expression in the hive or the ant-hill on the one hand, in human societies on the other . . . But in a hive or an ant-hill the individual is riveted to his task by his structure, and the organization is relatively invariable, whereas the human community is variable in form, open to every kind of progress. The result is that in the former each rule is laid down by nature, and is necessary; whereas in the latter only one thing is natural, the necessity of a rule. Thus the more in human society we delve down to the root of the various obligations to reach obligation in general, the more obligation will tend to become necessity, the nearer it will draw, in its peremptory aspect, to instinct. And yet we should make a great mistake if we tried to ascribe any particular obligation, whatever it might be, to instinct. What we must perpetually recall is that, no one obligation being instinctive, obligations as a whole would have been instinct if human societies were not, so to speak, ballasted with variability and intelligence. It is virtual instinct' (p. 17-18).

Bergson regards this type of morality as essentially very limited.

'The social instinct which we have detected at the basis of social obligation always has in view — instinct being relatively unchangeable — a closed society, however large . . . it is not itself concerned with humanity. For between the nation, however big, and humanity there lies the whole distance from the finite to the indefinite, from the

closed to the open' (p. 21). 'A different morality, another kind of obligation supervenes, above and beyond the social pressure' (p. 22-3).

So we come to the 'Call of the Hero' and complete morality.

Bergson outlines his view, which is very reminiscent of the Logos-incarnating, Archetypal Men of Philo Judaeus, in a paragraph:

'In all times there have arisen exceptional men, incarnating this morality . . . It is to them that men have always turned for that complete morality which we had best call absolute morality . . . this very fact suggests to us the existence of a difference of kind and not merely one of degree between the morality with which we have been dealing up to now and that we are about to study, between the maximum and the minimum, between the two extremes. Whereas the former is all the more unalloyed and perfect precisely in proportion as it is the more readily reduced to impersonal formulae, the second, in order to be fully itself, must be incarnate in a privileged person who becomes an example. The generality of the one consists in the universal acceptance of a law, that of the other in a common imitation of a model' (p. 23).

Such privileged leaders have the open soul and their morality is the morality of movement.

'The act by which the soul opens out broadens and raises to pure spirituality a morality enclosed and materialized in ready-made rules: the latter then becomes, in comparison with the other, something like a snapshot view of movement. Such is the inner meaning of the antitheses that occur one after the other in the Sermon on the Mount: "Ye have heard that it was said . . . I say unto you . . ." On the one hand the closed, on the other the open. Current morality is not abolished; but it appears like a virtual stop in the course of actual progression' (p. 46).

Bergson divides religion similarly into open and closed, or dynamic and static. Closed or static religion is normal institutional religion in general. It is held to take the place of instinct in societies where intelligence has become predominant.

'Since instinct no longer exists except as a mere vestige or virtuality, since it is not strong enough to incite to action or prevent it, it must arouse an illusory perception, or at least a counterfeit of recollection so clear and striking that intelligence will come to a decision accordingly. Looked at from this point of view, religion is then a defensive reaction of nature against the dissolvent power of intelligence' (p. 101).

It is also

'a defensive reaction of nature against the representation, by intelligence, of the inevitability of death' (p. 109).

Likewise, since man is finite and not omnipotent, while

'the vital impulse is optimistic,' 'all the religious representations which arise directly from it . . . are defensive reactions of nature against the

representation, by the intelligence, of a depressing margin of the unexpected between the initiative taken and the effect desired' (p. 117).

Dynamic religion, on the other hand, is mysticism. This not only

'lifts the soul to another plane': it also 'ensures for the soul, to a pre-eminent degree, the security and serenity which it is the function of static religion to provide . . . true mysticism is rare . . . it lies . . . at a point which the spiritual current, in its passage through matter, probably desired to reach but could not' (pp. 181-2).

Bergson reviews the history of mysticism, Greek, Oriental and Christian, and maintains that from Judaism and Christianity came the tradition which caused mysticism to pass from mere contemplation to activity.

'To cover the interval between thought and action an impetus was needed — and it was not forthcoming. We find this impetus in the prophets: they longed passionately for justice; demanded it in the name of the God of Israel; and Christianity, which succeeded Judaism, owed largely to the Jewish prophets the activity and efficiency of its mysticism, capable of marching on to the conquest of the world' (p. 206).

Having surveyed all too briefly his salient doctrines, we can perhaps see Bergson's significance in the history of thought a little more clearly. Bergson lived in the days of physical mechanism and dialectical materialism, which fail to give due value and consideration to personality and the individual, while over-emphasizing the importance of environment and of social and economic movements and forces. Bergson raised an emphatic protest in defence of the dignity of personality. Physics, dialectical materialism, and some forms of religion, such as Calvinism, were strongly deterministic. Bergson vindicated free-will. Yet he strongly affirmed the existence of designing intelligence in the whole life-process. At first, in the more liberal pre-Great War years, Bergson would be popular, as indeed he was; soon after the Great War strong reactions set in against such philosophies as Bergson's in most of these fields, but especially in politics and theology. With philosophers his intuitionalism could never be wholly acceptable, and his scientific views were sometimes highly controversial. Therefore Bergson's star suffered eclipse. Yet in spite of all his difficulties and assumptions — or should we say 'visions' or 'intuitions'? — Bergson had a message of lasting value even though it was the message of the prophet rather than of the logician. He was a prophet of freedom and an apostle of optimism.

THE PRACTICE OF RELIGION

By J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc.

RELIGION is a specific human activity like science or art, but there is some confusion as to what precisely this activity consists in. Some say it consists primarily in the holding of certain beliefs; others that religion consists in moral behaviour; others in the practice of a *cultus*. The truth is that religion, like science, involves certain prior beliefs or 'absolute presuppositions,' as Professor R. G. Collingwood has called them. Apart from these prior beliefs science and religion would be impossible. Science rests on a belief in the rationality of things and the uniformity of nature; religion on the belief that reality is not only accessible to us, but that its nature also is such that we can commune with it. So much for beliefs. As for conduct, it is not usually recognized that both science and art involve morality no less than does religion. No man can be a genuine student of science unless he is by habit truthful, just as no man can be a genuine artist unless he is sincere. Perhaps it would be true to say that morality is a by-product of religion, a product, that is to say, of the disciplines which religion involves. If there is a disadvantage in identifying religion with any set of beliefs, it is equally unfortunate to identify it with a particular code of conduct, because this may cause people to support religion for non-religious ends, *e.g.* to ensure social stability, a sober and industrious population, and so forth. If art for art's sake is a sound principle, religion for religion's sake is sound too. The point is that religion is an activity worth following for its own sake, and though both belief and conduct are involved, religion consists of neither.

But if religious activity consists neither in belief nor in morality, though involving both, in what does it consist? It consists in the specific activity known as prayer. You can have belief and morality and yet have no religion. But where you have prayer there you have religion. Prayer is the specific religious activity. In discussing prayer the best starting point is the axiom that prayer is an entirely natural activity, one not in

any sense 'precious' or possible only for the cultured or good. It is inevitable that we should have desires, and it is the most natural thing in the world that we should express them. 'We pray as spontaneously as we curse,' writes Santayana, 'and cry *Would to God!* without any theory of divine government.'[1] This stage of prayer is common to every man, even the unregenerate, and is also quite spontaneous, an almost automatic expression of felt desire. This may not be a very exalted, but it is a quite genuine and sincere stage of prayer.

Prayer may fail to pass beyond this stage, and if it does not advance further, there is, under present conditions, a likelihood that it will cease altogether, owing to the popular belief that prayer is powerless to 'affect events,' those events being determined by 'natural law.' This belief makes prayer appear a waste of time and a form of self-deception. Inhibitions of this sort are always unfortunate, when reasoning from defective premises leads to the suppression of a natural activity. This is part of the price that we pay for superficial popularizations of the results of scientific inquiry.

But if prayer as the natural expression of earnest desire does not cease in spite of the discouragements which the prevailing mental atmosphere offers, reflection is bound to occur as to the quality of these desires, whereby the individual praying may be led to see that they are either unreasonable, or selfish, or unworthy, or frivolous. Reflection will occur, too, as to the nature and character of the power addressed in prayer, and this will affect the estimate formed of the desires put forward. Such reflection is all to the good, and of value in itself as a step in spiritual self-education. Prayer would be worth while even if this were its only fruit.

But if prayer reaches this reflective stage, it is not likely that it will stop there. Reflection upon the nature of the mind or power addressed in prayer may lead to the conclusion that things can safely be left in those hands, so that to alter the course of events is no longer the primary motive of prayer. The suppliant can express his desires and aspirations then without any intention of 'calling on the Almighty to will what he does not will.' The motive of prayer may rather be to attempt to

[1] *The Realm of Spirit*, p. 246.

establish some degree of conscious contact with the source of our existence, and to hold converse as with a friend wiser, better, more sensitive than ourselves. The individual who prays thus is only making a further application of the principle which already applies in the sphere of his unconscious activity. We leave unconscious processes like the beating of the heart, or the healing of a cut, to nature, knowing that we can only hinder and not help these processes by 'taking thought' or worrying about them. In the same way the man who prays in the manner above indicated leaves things to his God, confident that if he so leaves them, he can be at peace about them.

But to pass on to methods of prayer. To speak of a 'technique of prayer' may be distasteful to many because they are rightly convinced that prayer must above everything be natural and unforced. There must be no stagey self-consciousness about it. Many people's objection to ceremonial springs from a belief that it involves fussiness and unnaturalness. Yet 'technique' is not a word to be frightened of. If one engages in an activity one may as well know how other more experienced people have gone to work. A technique is only an aid and an instrument; such things are useful and not to be despised. It seems to be the case that prayer has declined in quality, as it certainly has in extent, owing to a decline of interest in technique. To some extent the professional teachers of religion must accept responsibility for this, since they have emphasized doctrine and morality (and to-day politics) rather than offered practical assistance in the actual activity in which religion consists — prayer.[2]

The point is sometimes overlooked that besides giving his followers a formula of prayer, Jesus also supplied them with a technique. He warned them against the current technique of using 'vain repetitions,' and also against the dangers of publicity and seeking to earn a reputation for piety. 'But thou, when thou prayest,' he said (and the singular and not the plural is used — Jesus apparently had no use for mass prayers), 'enter

[2] The Rev. Bede Frost, in his book *The Art of Mental Prayer*, gives an instance of this. 'Some time ago,' he writes, 'an English diocesan Bishop addressed a questionnaire to his clergy in which he asked for information as to their teaching about, and practice of, prayer. The question did not receive a single answer!'

into thy closet, and when thou hast shut thy door, pray to thy Father which is in secret; and thy Father which seeth in secret shall reward thee.' This preliminary technique could not be improved upon. The point about solitude is that when he is alone a man is himself; he has no one to pose before, no one to be afraid or suspicious of. And there are yet further advantages. When a man is alone he can banish distractions, 'recollect' himself, and achieve some degree of interior stillness. But what is yet more important, when a man is alone he is in a rational frame of mind, not intoxicated with crowd emotions. His spiritual temperature may appear low, but it is a healthy temperature. Some preliminary attempt at 'withdrawal' is essential to prayer. It is quite legitimate for a man to use simple physical means to still himself, such as deep breathing, lying flat and relaxing all the muscles, or any of the posture devices customary among Indian devotees. The great thing is to avoid strain and tension and the attempt to force things; and perhaps it is well not to expect too much at first. In any case one does not pray for the sake of sensations or emotions or feelings; one prays (if one has a motive beyond the prayer itself) for strength and refreshment. Prayer ought to refresh the inner man as food and exercise refresh the body.

People who are 'visualizers' are sometimes helped to make an operation if they can picture it. Let them imagine, then, that they are leaning back upon something that will support them with an infinite yet gentle strength, like water when they float upon it. Others perhaps will picture their consciousness as a channel between themselves and God; the channel must be cleared by stilling the mind, then the flow will be as smooth and regular as the siphoning of a liquid from one vessel to another. Other people need no pictures, which only confuse them. Such persons can be still without having to picture stillness. The trouble with many people is that some wrong and quite impossible picture has been fixed in their minds from childhood. They picture to themselves a Figure seated on a throne up on high. God for them is a being far away, 'the outside God,' as Tyrrell put it. And sometimes only a new picture can push out the old one. In which case it may prove helpful to represent the relationship of the soul to God in a kind of pattern, in which the lower

(or if preferred, higher) levels of the soul are in close contact with the foundation on which it rests. No picture is infallible, and people should not be afraid of manufacturing their own.

Another hindrance to the regular practice of prayer is that it seems to involve such a terrible effort of concentration. It is hard enough to make a picture, but it is harder still to concentrate mind and will upon it. The mere effort to keep attention closely directed makes distraction leap out on us from all sides. Possibly some remarks of the late Dom John Chapman may be of use here :

> 'The simplest way of making an act of attention to God, is by an act of inattention to everything else. It is rather like the act of trying to go to sleep.'
>
> 'I recommend you in prayer to think as little as possible, and say as little as possible. Now and then remain quite *idle*, as it were, and get into the habit of doing this (a sort of suspension), if it comes easily, at any time of the day.'
>
> 'I think it may sometimes be that *intensity* in prayer, which causes some slight fatigue, is a natural exertion on one's own part, which does not do any good to the prayer. It is better to be quite peaceful, without effort, except the effort to remain in peace. You see, what *we* do is tiring, and it is also absolutely an impediment to God's working in us.'
>
> 'The rule is simply : '*Pray as you can, and do not try to pray as you can't.* Take yourself as you find yourself, and start from that.' [3]

In prayer, not only the right technique but the right attitude is necessary, and of the two the latter is the more important. While technique is not to be despised, it must always be subsidiary. As to what the right attitude is to be, we may discover this by examining the opening of that formula of prayer given by Jesus. We may note the following points :

(1) The first word of the prayer indicates that though prayer may be an activity best engaged upon in solitude, the individual who prays does not regard himself as cut off from his fellows. He is conscious that the completely isolated individual is an impossibility. If he existed, he would not be human. Thus the right attitude for prayer includes an awareness of a connection with other men.

(2) The phrase 'which art in heaven' indicates that the object of prayer is not ourselves, nor any projection of ourselves, but a

[3] *Spiritual Letters*, pp. 122, 98, 130, 109.

reality 'above' us, not in the sense of locality but of quality; though the title 'Father' shows also that this reality is not 'other' in the sense of being separated by some gulf—in which case, of course, all intercourse would be impossible, since intercourse involves community of nature. Thus the attitude for prayer is one of humility, but also of confidence in a reciprocal return.

(3) The two phrases 'Thy kingdom come,' 'Thy will be done,' are not perhaps the mere equivalents they are often taken to be. At any rate, when the latter phrase was used by Jesus himself at Gethsemane, it constituted a prayer of 'acceptance' and submission. Thus the joint pair of phrases indicate an attitude of *complete* willingness to co-operate, not only actively but *passively*. It is important to stress this point because both from temperament and conviction most of us identify virtue with action rather than passion (using that word in its proper original sense).[4] The idea of 'acceptance' is commonly misunderstood. It is the attitude of a man who 'simply receives what comes to him moment by moment, abandoning himself thereto, accepting and *willing* everything *because* it comes as God's will for him here and now.'[5] Psychologically, this method of meeting life is thoroughly sound, as Jung testifies, one of whose patients wrote to him as follows:

> 'Out of evil, much good has come to me. By keeping quiet, remaining attentive, and by accepting reality—taking things as they are, and not as I wanted them to be—by doing all this, rare knowledge has come to me. I always thought that, when we accept things, they overpower us in one way or another. Now this is not true at all, and it is only by accepting them that one can define an attitude towards them. So now I intend playing the game of life, being receptive to whatever comes to me, good and bad.'[6]

This 'passive' side of virtue is not to be written off as a sort of escapist pietism. A technique of living that will multiply a man's powers of endurance creates a type of individual who is resistant to most types of pressure. Such powers are an import-

[4] It is matter for regret that this good word should now signify a condition the very reverse of enduring and patient, but given over to revolt and repudiation.

[5] Dom Hudleston's description of de Caussade's doctrine of '*abandon*.'

[6] Quoted from *The Secret of the Golden Flower*, by Alan W. Watts in his *The Legacy of Asia and Western Man*, p. 77.

ant asset to the man of action, which is why the man of action is also, in many notable cases, the man of prayer. According to Mr. Gunther's *Inside Asia*, this is the case with the Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who spends half an hour of each day in prayer.

The man who attempts to practise religion in a non-religious epoch is in much the same position as one who should attempt to practise art in an age of artistic decadence. He feels isolated and out of accord with his fellows, and tends to suffer on that account. Just as an art lover in the Victorian epoch had to dress and act like an eccentric and be ridiculed by *Punch*, so in the present day the man who takes to religion tends to be self-conscious about it and on the defensive, possibly becoming a pietist with an interest in copes, candles and incense. Contemporary life seems to have no use for him or his religious activity, so he rejects contemporary life and seeks to return to the past. Just as the aesthete is the product of an age when art is dead or dying, so the pietist is a product of an age when religion is in a similar condition. Unhappily that is the condition of religion to-day, so that a plea for a return to prayer will seem to many people to be equivalent to a plea for pietism, a despairing signal for a retreat into the sacristy.

But the situation now is that the public, taught by adversity and crisis, is beginning to realize that religion is a highly important and serious activity which we neglect at our peril. Thus to plead for a renewal of that activity is not just to be asking to run away from life and seek refuge in mists and emotions. It is a plea that people should make an earnest attempt to increase their interior resources, to gain fresh powers of action, of endurance, of insight and sympathy, and not least of practical judgment.

This will not be achieved by each man working by himself in isolation from others; what is needed is a co-operative attempt to develop our powers. Mr. H. G. Wells in a recent book on the fate of *homo sapiens* pleaded for a new movement like that which a century and a half ago produced the French Encyclopaedists. Doubtless that would be an excellent thing, for we cannot have too much scientific enlightenment. But there is another kind of enlightenment that we need even more, the knowledge of moral and spiritual values, not to speak of the singleness of purpose,

the courage and the self-sacrifice which alone will turn those ideas into reality. Is it not possible for groups of individuals to pool their resources and make a determined effort at research into the methods of attaining the kind of enlightenment, as well as the kind of fortitude, that are so much needed? The Dominicans and Franciscans did something of the sort for Europe of the thirteenth century; but their lineal descendants certainly cannot do the same for the twentieth century, which is in just as sore need, for they are not the genuine equivalents of their predecessors. They may wear the same garb and repeat the same formulae, but they are not the same men. Has our civilization enough *life* in it to produce its own saviours as a kind of antitoxin to the disease which is destroying it?

There is no reason why it should not. Our civilization still displays tremendous vitality. If it could but use its interior resources as it exploits its exterior ones! If it sought spiritual enlightenment and strength with the same seriousness that it now seeks scientific knowledge! If this happened a revival of religion would sweep away our moribund religious institutions as a flood sweeps away rubbish.

JOY WITHIN TRAGEDY

By Kenneth Henderson, Perth, Australia; Chaplain with the Anzacs in Gallipoli.

'AS sorrowful yet always rejoicing.' It is hard for Christians to live out that injunction of the great Apostle to-day. It came from a spirit oppressed often enough by personal danger, suffering and weariness, and troubled by the infantile but critical ailments of the early Church, but it was the voice of one who felt the glory of a great task for the world, and who experienced the power within its perilous and apparently feeble beginnings. There is indeed always a joy in the exercise of man's highest capacities. To-day amusements can give us moments, but only moments, of relief from our pain. But in trying to make something worthy of our storm of tragedy, in being resolute, compassionate and wise for the time, we feel threads of pain it is true, but the undertone of this creative effort

is a joy which has its source beneath the current of passing events, for it is an experience of life from a source that is eternal; the glory of life offering itself to all who humble themselves to receive it. Service is turned into sacrifice, and sacrifice is fellowship with God. 'In His will is our peace.'

In Christianity, at all times, and in all circumstances, there is a fundamental spring of gladness which is the secret of its vitality. That joy of course is never unmingled with sombre threads of thought and feeling. It is aware of sin and pain. Those who share the religion of the Cross have always a sense of responsibility for the sins of the surrounding world, and feel those sins as personal wounds. Those who worship the Father in spirit and in truth must be pierced by an ever deepening and widening sense of compassion for all His children. But there is a joy in the fight against evil, and those who can sympathize with sufferers and share in any kind of effort to help them, know too that there is a kind of joy in that. There is a joy in bracing oneself to composure for the sake of others in the spirit of à Kempis:

> 'Be strong with Christ, and for Christ, if thou desire to reign with Christ.'

And those who will endure to-day's agony with courage know that there is a full deep undertone of joy running through their ordeal. As a theme in music our rejoicing has many variations.

First, there is a common pride of the right kind. The British peoples have just cause to be proud of the part they are called on to take at this moment in the world's history. The Greater Britain lives not only in the British Isles but in her younger nations and the peoples of alien race who have been drawn together by what is fine and generous in the temper that is common to the British Commonwealth. The tradition is not stainless, as Cardinal Hinsley recalled in his recent wise and noble broadcast, but it is leavened by the great redeeming character of magnanimity. So to-day the British Empire carries with it into the solitary battle the hopes and prayers of all men of goodwill throughout the world, of every lover of freedom among the nations conquered by Germany or still free. Never in history has this Greater Britain held such a position of dignity in the high meaning of that word.

Wars are won with weapons and in obedience to the laws of mechanics. These laws will not be suspended on our behalf. But physical forces are wielded by the spirit of man. And to-day we feel humble and proud in the conviction that we draw strength for the conflict from the fundamental source of wisdom and goodness in the Universe — from God. The root of the matter is in Abraham Lincoln's words during dark days in the American Civil War:

> 'I am not bound to win, but I am bound to be true. I am not bound to succeed, but I am bound to live up to what light I have. I must stand with anybody that stands right; stand with him while he is right, and part with him when he goes wrong.'

In this faith is great fighting power. For to-day's battle we have sound and reasonable hopes of victory, but apart from these calculations, a sombre thread of joy runs through the cause, uniting us with the fighting man in whom the common matter of life is distilled into dedication and sacrifice.

The joy of the Christian has many moods. Even in war-time we must not bend the bow too long and hard. We must have faith enough to rest when necessary. All our rejoicing must in a sense be in God, in the sense that it must stand the test of Christ's words: 'Your joy no man taketh from you.' For what the surrounding tumult can reach, it will sweep away. This rejoicing in God is possible at different distances from the centre Let it give a keener edge to the precious homely joys of life — books, games, the familiar loveliness of nature. A little extra sharpness of savouring, a little extra effort of attention, to say grace as it were, when we enjoy a book of Jane Austen's, a game of golf, a country walk, or a good film. 'Whatever Hitler does he can't take away that view,' said a companion to me as we gazed from the practice tee of the Nedlands golf links over the River Swann. Make the most of the healthy pleasures and secure them by praising the Father for them. To be thankful is the fulfilment of every kind of gladness, the seal of its possession.

The source of the homely joy and of the gladness that persists through ennobled tragedy is God. And the greatest and most indestructible joy is God Himself, a joy that finds a new music for each mood. The presence of God is an unfamiliar gladness to most of us. We assume too hastily that, because of

our habitual level of living, we are incapable of the joy of God. But let us try again at this time and ask for and accept that power, which, as Plotinus said, 'all men have but few use,' to centre our thoughts very frequently on God. Let us open our minds to God as the source of wisdom and love, beauty and power, and try to see Him offering Himself through what is happening in and around us.

For God is throughout this tumult, and God will go on. From Him all thoughts of truth and love, righteousness and beauty are proceeding and will come. After the present agony, whatever kind of world it leaves, whatever political arrangements, whatever disappointments and hopes, God will be. And from Him will still proceed in all languages thoughts of wisdom and peace, reconciliation and hope, for you and me to hear, accept, and serve. He does not offer comfort, but the joy of creation. Therefore let us face a future coming towards us enshrouded in clouds and darkness knowing that, whatever the facts and forces it thrusts upon us, we shall be able to acquit ourselves with honour in the light, good-will and power that it brings from God. In the nature of things such conduct must pass into the history of the world, and into our own future as a people.

Finally, there is always the joy of looking up into the steadfast glory of God, passionately awaiting our assent to descend upon us. I can find no greater words than von Hügel's to express the sense of God's enveloping joy:

> 'For indeed dreary and petty, oppressive and imprisoning, is our poor little life, on its surface and apart from God and from His merciful condescension towards us. But we would not know our misery, we would not feel it as such, were there not Saints and Heroes around us, and Christ our Lord above us, and encompassing all and penetrating all, God . . . the Sympathiser, God the Joy, the Ocean of Joy, our Home.'

THE QUEST FOR A CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

By the Rev. Ian Ramsey, M.A., sometime Burney Prizeman and Student of the University of Cambridge.

IT is commonly assumed by both party politicians and patent-medicine manufacturers that they alone know what is wrong with the world and that they alone have the remedy. My own professional standpoint being less cosmic in character than that of either of these universal benefactors, what I have to say will be correspondingly more modest; but it will be concerned none the less with two similar points, *viz.*: (1) *one* feature of the present age on which none can congratulate themselves, and (2) some *suggestions* as to a possible remedy for what seems to be a deplorable state of affairs.

What is this 'deplorable state of affairs'? In a word, the present situation of, and relations between, some philosophers and some theologians; or, as others would say, the situation of, and relations between, 'Philosophy' and 'Religion.' Those who take their intellectual exercise by flogging what they inconsistently assert to be the dead horse of liberal theology, fail to see another animal which is by no means an 'also ran'—the donkey of 'Nonsense out of Panic,' which can bray in both Philosophical and Theological Stakes when occasion demands. We witness, in fact, a flight from Reason which leads to philosophical and theological panic of the most reprehensible kind: we witness an utter bankruptcy of philosophical and theological thought. Such is the deplorable state of affairs which confronts us to-day.

And what is to be the remedy? For myself, I see only one hope: the setting forward of such a system of speculative and constructive philosophy as will be adequate not only for the philosopher, but for the Christian.

The present article will be devoted to some remarks by way of elaboration of each of the two points mentioned: (1) a review of recent relations between philosophy and religion; (2) a

few tentative suggestions as to the road ahead. For the present, then, we will confine ourselves to point (1).

To begin our review, it is natural and desirable to go back to the hey-day of Hegelianism, to the time when Hegelianism seemed to be providing for the educated a general thought-background which could nevertheless give (so it was felt) a due place to Christianity. And I think we must admit at the outset that however unfortunate, even suicidal, this *entente cordiale* between philosophy and religion proved to be, yet it is an indication of the strength and vitality that 'sound learning,' even now, might give to 'true religion.'

Those who have encountered the disaster known as Hegel will know best how utterly absurd it would be to profess to summarize Hegelianism in a few sentences. Nevertheless I propose, for the sake of the greater good, to attempt such absurdity.

Roughly speaking, one of Hegel's main tasks was so to arrange the Categories or 'ways of thinking' that our thought would correspond most closely to that Truth which might be called Reality. We might even regard him in the 'Logic' as setting out to give that scheme or system of Categories which, by indicating their true relative position, would thus indicate their proper 'use.' I may add in passing that I do not think that we are unnecessarily clothing Hegel in Cambridge corduroys if we do so regard his purpose as *in part* one of clarification. Hegel, then, was concerned with the mutual relations of the Categories, and the final scheme, as all devotees of *The Daily Worker* will already know, was made up of related 'Triads,' or groups of three, which were known from their mutual relations as 'dialectical.'

Now the importance, from our point of view, of all this is that Hegel claimed to produce one triad composed of the three categories of Art, Philosophy and Religion. From the two latter categories and their mutual relations, proceeded *both* the Hegelian support *and* the Hegelian betrayal of Christianity. Let us see how this was so.

For Hegel the content of Religion was the same as the content of Philosophy—its peculiarity was that it expressed the truths of Philosophy in a mythological form in which they could be grasped by the ordinary man. The essence of this mythological

form was that it expressed timeless realities and eternal relations in terms of persons and historical events, and their causal relations. For example, the Christian Myth, according to Hegel, would be that God first existed alone; that He then created the world and man; that sin entered into the world at some time in the past and had been there ever since, being partly inherited; that God became Incarnate to save man from the results of sin; and that there will be finally a Last Judgment leading to an eternal Kingdom of God. Hegel regarded all that as a setting out, or dramatization, in temporal terms of what were indeed genuine facts about eternal objects and timeless relations.[1] So far so good — or bad, as you choose.

It must be noticed, Hegel would say, that the mythological form is bound to 'distort' timeless facts to a greater or less extent, so that religions can be arranged according to their amount of distortion. At the top would come 'Absolute Religion,' which would be a religion in which there was a minimum of distortion. This, for Hegel, was Christianity.[2]

Now it is clear that Hegel's general theory of Religion is of considerable value, and there can be no doubt that he was considered by many Christians to have sent their stock soaring. He had done justice to *all* religions and yet had managed to justify intellectually some sort of unique position for Christianity. Further, by his scheme of categories he had shown that since all religions are attempts — albeit mythological — to express the fundamental nature of Reality, then they cannot be discussed in terms of the categories of Natural Science or of 'Common Sense.' Thus the Christian could rightly regard the pseudo-arguments of the ordinary scientific rationalist as mere noises.

But Hegelianism proved to be a wolf in sheep's clothing: for in the end there was, for Hegel, a category in the same triad as, yet superior to, that of Religion, *viz.* that of Philosophy. Reality was only apprehended with complete adequacy and clarity at this level of Philosophy—an apprehension very similar

[1] Readers acquainted with the lectures of Professor C. D. Broad will realise how much I am indebted to him for parts of this summary.

[2] For further details see Wallace, *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, §§ 564-577, especially 572, 573 and Introductory Essay I. Also W. T. Stace, *Philosophy of Hegel*, pp. 484-518.

to what Spinoza called the Third Kind of Knowledge. So could the philosopher (always of course the Hegelian philosopher) pass beyond the distortions of religion so as to be in a better position to patronize it. Religion was a useful inn for those who were not called to the luxury of the Ritz. But once an alternative centre of attraction and sustenance was provided in the Hegelian hotel, we should do well, of course, to cast off the lesser works of darkness and inconvenience.

Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes : Christians had good reason to fear Hegel despite the gifts he brought. But before leaving him let us notice three points :

(1) All Christian philosophical systems must be able to give a unique place to Christianity, and Hegel to some extent did that. But :

(2) Religion is NOT popular philosophy as Hegel would have us believe : indeed a true Philosophy WITH Religion will constitute a 'Life Entire' more concrete than either.

(3) Hegel, however, is to be commended for formulating a categorial scheme which (*a*) while it shews clearly the limitations of the scientific categories, yet (*b*) at the same time indicates their essential kinship with the categories of religion. Such a critique of the categories will always be needed if we are to give a due and proper place to science, and at the same time keep free from the unedifying and singularly undignified conflicts that arise between theologians and scientists as between hens in a farmyard, and usually with less justification.

After even merely glancing at Hegelianism, it is hardly surprising to hear that the *rapprochement* it fostered between philosophy and religion (and which, in a developed form, had such success at Oxford through people like T. H. Green) was doomed in the end to failure. About 1900, Hegelianism began to wilt under the logical breezes of Moore and Russell, and the reaction, so far as philosophy was concerned, had set in. It remained only for the politicians, with characteristic simplicity of heart, to don this cast-off clothing, so that Hegel is now chiefly commemorated in the twin systems of Communism and Fascism. For Hegel, the knowledge that he was father of both would be as welcome as proctorial visits to Oxford hotels.

However, to return to our review of the relations between philosophy and religion, we must note that, since the break with Hegelianism, there has been a progressive deterioration in their mutual relations: and, I would add, a progressive deterioration in the value and worth of each. In philosophy, the admirable and justifiable movement of Moore and Russell in favour of clarification as a function of philosophy has been pushed to highly ingenious but ridiculous extremes in those varied doctrines of 'Logical Positivism' with which the names of the Vienna Circle (especially Schlick), Professor Wittgenstein and Mr. Ayer are united in varying degrees of disgrace. For them (on one interpretation) theology is literally 'nonsense,' because it uses words and symbols which cannot be manipulated according to the 'rules' of any known 'game of language' concerned with sense-experience.

But philosophy has never unfortunately had a monopoly of absurdity, and Barthianism, with its distaste for Reason, seems to be an admirable partner for our new brand of philosophical method. For, strange as it might seem, both represent an attack on, and a distrust of, Reason. To the Logical Positivist the use of 'Reason' is no more than a 'correct' manipulation of symbols, 'correct,' that is, in the sense of being in accordance with the 'rules' of the 'language-game' we are playing at the time; to the Barthian, though he would not like to admit it, we must be at the mercy of uncriticized emotions and unsystematized thought, and the one and only connection between the Word of God and Reason seems to concern no more than the will of the late Lord Gifford. So is the Irrational enthroned, and natural theology viewed with the same distaste as a full-length fur coat at the Chelsea Arts Ball.

The wheel has, indeed, turned full circle — that is why it was natural and desirable to start with Hegel. From a Hegelian synthesis of philosophy and religion we have arrived by reaction at a point where there is a universal distrust of Reason — in religion, for fear that religion should ever again be confused with philosophy; in philosophy, because the ideal of clarification has led philosophers to suppose that 'symbol-*use*' is synonymous with 'symbol-*manipulation*.' This is the 'deplorable state of affairs' I mentioned at the start.

What have we to say about the remedy? Of what nature is the road ahead? No doubt loyal subscribers to the 'Signposts' series will already have decided that I am several months out of date: for, they will say, what of the Thomism or Neo-Thomism we are struggling to popularize? Have we not here precisely that system of speculative and constructive philosophy which you suggested might provide our intellectual salvation? The challenge is one of sufficient importance to deserve an answer. We must ask ourselves, then: is Thomism or Neo-Thomism likely to be necessary or adequate? About this I have three remarks to make:

(1) For St. Thomas Aquinas we can have nothing but profound admiration: an intellect of the first rank—honest, broad-minded, and learned. But Thomism seems to me to exhibit such a degree of Scholastic systematization that to meddle with it would be both impertinent and ill-advised. I cannot understand those who endeavour to put new wine into old bottles: there is a strong suspicion that they do not know much about wine. Yet I can always sympathize with those who say 'The old is good.' Thomism *is* good, very good, much better than some of its more pretentious descendants. And so it seems to me to be a choice between pure Thomism or a new venture altogether. The question is: Is Thomism adequate?

(2) I cannot see why we *should* expect Thomism to be adequate as a present-day philosophy: our experience to-day is far wider than in the medieval period—in particular, I cannot see how St. Thomas' Doctrine of Substance, for example, could be linked with the categories of Modern Science. Yet St. Thomas exhibited a far healthier interest in and respect for contemporary Natural Science than do many of his present devotees. And even Hegel was wise enough to see that any constructive philosophy needs to provide for a philosophy of the Sciences.

(3) On the other hand, Thomism deals most commendably with Christianity and gives a due place to religion. And its doctrine of Man is much more satisfactory than that of Descartes—a theory of the self that lies behind much of the so-called science and common-sense of to-day.

In the end, then, my answers to the challenge of Thomism are two: (1) It seems to me to be too much bound up with

Scholasticism to be adequate to present-day needs. Apart from being bound up with an antiquated philosophy of science, it breathes too much of that thirst for universal certainty which is typical of the *a priori* approach, a thirst for certainty that some have found likewise satisfied in an inordinate affection for an infallible Papacy. (2) What is more, I fail to see why Thomism or any of its direct descendants should have any *special* claim on our intelligence, to the point that they preclude us from doing some independent reflection. Surely St. Thomas would have been the first to encourage independency of thought. What the 'Signpost' series calls the 'congenial and bracing climate of an ancient Faith' suggests to me some lukewarm, immoveable Anglican Sea rather than the bracing breezes of a Brighton or a Blackpool.

I would plead, then, for an intellectual courage and persistence — more of the primitive Christian παρρησία and ὑπομονή — which would press on to a new constructive Christian philosophy which might be one of the very few positive contributions of a tragic age to the main stream of civilization.

We have now been brought again to the second of the two points we mentioned at the start: what suggestions have I for the road ahead? What alternative have I to offer as an appetizer to those whose mental ration-cards preclude a Thomist banquet? If the appetizer is to be not only palatable but sustaining, our philosophical chef will need, I believe, to secure at least three ingredients, about each of which I will venture to make one or two remarks by way of elucidation.

(1) *The first need is that we should be quite clear as to what is the function and end of philosophy.*

We cannot (nor would we as inheritors of the empirical tradition of this island) disregard the empirical tendencies in pesent-day philosophy; on the other hand, we must have a Doctrine of Experience far more critical in its analysis, and comprehensive in its scope, than that which satisfies the youthful zeal of the Logical Positivist. Experience is *not* a swarm of 'ideas' somehow lumped together merely by psychological relations such as Association; nor is it to be limited to sense-experience. Our empirical view of the function of philosophy may well need

the shades of an F. H. Bradley and even of a Hegel to counteract any ghost of a David Hume or of a Dr. Wittgenstein. We must run with the metaphysical hare though we be empirical hounds.

And while our philosophy must thus have an empirical function (Wittgenstein leavened with Bradley), it must also have a two-fold end: (i) as a game of reflective experience, it will aim at a reflective, ordered, systematized life; (ii) parallel to this, there will be elaborated a correlated language-system which, by its use of words and its scheme of categories, will express verbally the consistency and comprehensiveness of that all-round, ordered life which must ever be the philosopher's primary aim. There must be no divorce between philosophy and life; the philosopher and the plain man must meet together, and wisdom must order 'all things graciously.'

(2) *Secondly, in any adequate Christian philosophy the theory of the Self and a Doctrine of Immortality must, I believe, be closely linked.*

We might here be well guided by the Thomist endeavour to do justice to man in his dual (if in some respects unenviable) position of being the upper limit of the animals, and the lower limit of the angels. St. Thomas very wisely refused either to disregard or to explain away the problem of man's place in the universe. For my own part, I believe that a satisfactory alternative solution may be found in some theory of the Self that defines Personality not only in terms of a mind and a body, but also introduces a third constituent which we may call a Spirit, Soul or Timeless Self, according to taste. Something like the noumenal Self of Kant, or that Eternal Self of the closing pages of Spinoza's 'Ethics,' may yet be needed if we are to secure an adequate and comprehensive analysis of all our experience, especially of volition. '*Sentimus experimurque nos aeternos esse*,' said Spinoza; and our citizenship, even now, must be in heaven. But how we are, nevertheless, to keep faithful to our empirical standpoint, or how we are to talk of a timeless self without indulging in nonsense, are questions we cannot discuss here.

(3) *Finally, in reaching our idea of God we shall do well to take our cue from the relation of God to the world of sense-*

experience, analyzing that idea of God as far as possible in terms of our concept of personality. So will the transition be, as with St. Bonaventura, from Nature up to Nature's God, from the creature to the Creator. We may perhaps find that the essentials of a Berkeleian concept of God can be retained even when we have rejected the doctrine of ideas by which the subtle Bishop reached it.

Those then are my three suggestions as to the philosophical road ahead, and I would but add two corollaries: (i) Provided we think out adequately our view of philosophy as *Empirical in its function*, I do not see why, when once it has obtained its working system of concepts, it should not justifiably provide the requisite thought-background for a Christian theology. (ii) Nor do I see why, since philosophy rightly viewed is also *Regulative in its end*, we should fall into the Hegelian trap of subsuming religion under philosophy, *i.e.* of thinking that religion is just popular philosophy. Rather would philosophy pass into religion as its consummation: the reflective life being but part of a Life Entire devoted to God.

BOOK REVIEWS

GERMANY AGAINST WORLD ORDER*

Western civilization is passing through a very grave crisis. Christians are asking, what has the Church to say about it, what way out can it offer? The Bishop of Chichester has written an answer to these questions. He says:

> 'I have written this book because I am a believer and want to share my belief with others. I am certain that the Christian faith has a word of incalculable value for these times. I am certain that it is the truth about human life, personal, social, international.'

His book is a challenge to Christians to understand their faith better, and to apply it more wisely and more earnestly to the problems of life and society. He is not content with the stuffy platitudes which are all the guidance that many Christians give, when they are asked to outline a practical policy based on Christian principles. His proposals are definite and on the whole they are wise. They should inspire Christians to renewed efforts and give them fresh hope. His book is also a challenge

* *Christianity and World Order*. By the Bishop of Chichester. (Penguin Special, 6*d*., 1940.)

to non-Christians; for it is hard to see any other way to a better world order except the Christian one.

It may seem ungenerous to find faults in a book which on the whole is so fresh, so wise and so inspiring. But there is one essential point over which the Bishop of Chichester goes astray. He misinterprets the German outlook and the German spirit. He writes, for instance:

> 'Nobody wants war for its own sake; while practically everybody wants peace.'

Hitler said he did not want war! He then quotes Hitler's letter of August 27th, 1939, to Daladier:

> 'I year by year sought to obtain by means of negotiation the revision of at least the most incredible and most intolerable clauses of this *Diktat*' (Versailles).

The Bishop of Chichester misunderstands Hitler's outlook in two ways. First the clauses of the Versailles Treaty were 'incredible and intolerable' to Hitler, not because they were unjust, but because they were the results of a war which Germany had lost. The Treaty was intolerable to Germany because it took from her territories which were once hers. Secondly, it is untrue to say Hitler wants peace. Munich was a disappointment to him, although it gave him more than he demanded. Why? Because it prevented him from making a military parade into Prague on which he had set his heart. He had his desire in the following March.

Hitler like Mussolini glorifies war, and believes no virile nation can exist without it. He thinks that nations which desire to live in peace are effete and done for. In this connection Hitler speaks not for National Socialists only, but also for a very large section of the German people. The Bishop is wrong in saying, 'National Socialism is not typical of the German spirit.' It is quite typical. The Nazis to-day justify their barbarous methods of warfare in this respect by arguments taught them by Frederick the Great and Bismarck and used in the Great War. 'It is the same old Boche,' as the French say.

The establishment of world order is the subject of the Bishop's book. The extreme difficulty of this is shown by Mr. E. L. Woodward in his Oxford Pamphlet No. 41. He writes:

> 'The worship of power, a contempt for mercy and gentleness, the sacrifice of the individual to the State, a belief in war as the highest and most ennobling form of human activity, these were the lessons taught to the younger generation in Germany not merely by the Hitler Youth Movement, but by school teachers in the years before the war. Hitler is thus the creature, not the creator of a German nationalism which justifies every bestiality, every act of bad faith practised in the interests of the increase of the power of the German State. Hitler, Goering and their like have been admired and followed because they spell out in staring letters a theme which less forceful and less vociferous Germans have adopted for themselves.'

> Since this is the enemy we are fighting, it is foolish to write that
> '(every Christian) will be on the watch not to let slip any genuine chance of a negotiated peace which observes the principle of Order and Justice.'

How can one negotiate with men who do not keep their word?

Talk of disarmament is also misguided and harmful. No one denies that some Germans are decent and peaceable; but it will take at least a generation to root out of German minds their poisonous philosophy of blood and violence. Until this is done England and her Allies will have to maintain very strong forces in Europe. England's disarmament since 1919 and her unwillingness to fight have been among the factors which gave Hitler his chance. Because we did not understand the German outlook we failed to establish world order in 1919 and afterwards. We are now fighting another war for the same purpose. When we have won, as we surely shall, let us make sure that our victory is not again undone by the same ignorance.

J. K. NETTLEFOLD.

CAMBRIDGE LEADERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION *

To those who have taught Scripture and seen it taught to children withdrawn under the Anson By-Law or even in some Church of England schools, this little book will be a very welcome surprise and invaluable aid. Not only does it supply in a form readable and easily understood all the material to clothe the dry skeleton of any Syllabus, but it is also fully abreast of all types of modern knowledge, critical scholarship and new theology. With an admirably simple and clear presentation it makes the fruits of all these available for the use of both teacher and child.

The Handbook, we are told, has been 'prepared under the direction of the Institute of Christian Education at the request of the Cambridgeshire Local Education Authority,' and Dr. Yeaxlee wrote, the Preface informs us, in consultation with an Advisory Committee, half of whom had shared in the formation of the Syllabus. It is intended for the Senior Section, children of 11+ to 15+.

In many ways the Handbook may prove to be a landmark. The Cowper-Temple Clause of 1870, embodied in the Education Act, 1921, Sect. 28(2), allowed 'no religious catechism and no religious formulary distinctive of any particular denomination' to be taught in State schools (p. 10). Although it was declared in the Commons in 1876 that the Ten Commandments, the Lord's Prayer and the Apostles' Creed were not sectarian and could be taught within the Clause (p. 217), there can be no doubt that the result was that a vague, emasculated 'Biblical knowledge' was often taught which not only had little connexion with religion, but was

* *Handbook to the Cambridgeshire Syllabus of Religious Teaching.* By Basil A. Yeaxlee, M.A., B.Litt., Ph.D. (Student Christian Movement Press. Price 4*s.* 6*d.*)

certainly not abreast of modern scholarship in Biblical Studies and Theology, and therefore caused religion to be regarded with apathy and ridicule compared with other subjects, like science and history, really brought up-to-date and well-taught. If furthermore the teacher was consciously agnostic or sectarian, so that he was stronger on the negative issues than the positive or provided a hostile atmosphere, the inclusion of 'religious instruction' in the school curriculum might be worse than its entire absence.

Since those days experience has forced upon public opinion and responsible authorities the fact that, as the Spens Report says,

> 'No boy or girl can be counted as properly educated unless he or she has been made aware of the fact of the existence of a religious interpretation of life . . . the Bible is the classic book of Christianity and forms the basis of the structure of Christian faith and worship . . . it is possible for a teacher so to approach that literature and present those ideas that the difficulty of appearing to take sides in traditional controversies may be avoided,' and, very significantly, 'it can hardly be disputed that the best teacher is one whose interest in the subject in affirming and working upon precisely these principles' (p. 11),

Moreover, as the Handbook goes on to say, again quoting the Report,

> 'the Scriptures can be taught and the historical divergencies in Christian thought explained "without incurring the suspicion of insincerity or prejudice — personal or denominational"' (p. 11).

Being really abreast of fearless modern scholarship makes this possible and is an impenetrable armour against scepticism.

When we consider the nature of this Handbook approved by educational leaders of all denominations in Cambridgeshire and this statement in the introduction:

> 'The Spens Report was not published till after the Cambridgeshire Syllabus had been completed and signed, but the representative committee of teachers from the area, Anglican and Free Church scholars, and officers of the local education authority were at one throughout in affirming and working upon precisely these principles' (p. 11),

we realize how very far religious instruction can go within the Cowper-Temple Clause when interpreted by authorities and teachers anxious to impart true and living Christianity. In these days when the maintenance of denominational Church of England Schools becomes increasingly difficult and the provision of adequate Church Senior Schools almost impossible, this is most encouraging. It promises to give us what is better than denominational schools, a truly religious and Christian teaching, atmosphere and upbringing throughout the State Schools. This in its turn should be a long step on the way to a United Church.

With regard to the arrangement of the Handbook it is best described in its own words:

> 'During the senior period, the central thread is traced three times,

> but in each case from a different point of view. This is by no means a return to the "concentric" method . . . The outline for the first and second years in the senior school brings out the events in their sequence, but not without revealing the simpler aspects of their meaning. Then in the third and fourth years greater attention is paid to the meaning, but still in close relationship to the order of the events' (p. 14).

In fact the arrangement of the Old Testament, Apocryphal and New Testament passages and periods is so good that the historical development of Judaism and the genesis of Christianity are excellently though simply brought out in the first two years. The important period between the Testaments is particularly well treated, and it was especially felicitous to combine the study of *Mark* and *Acts* i-iv in one continuous whole in order to give a true perspective. In the second two years the treatment is more general and theological. Here denominational differences might have been expected to cause trouble. They do not, however, appear and a strong universal Christianity is taught.

Throughout the book there is a healthy insistence that Christianity and Theology are rooted in life, practice and experience. Thus at the start *Mark* is said to be

> 'a particularly good basis for teaching boys and girls, since it enables them to appreciate vividly the experiences of those first disciples, and thus to discover for themselves the meaning of the later apostolic preaching and of the enduring faith of the Christian Church. Theology is then rightly seen to be the attempt to explain intellectually what can only be fully experienced in a living religion of devotion and obedience' (p. 16). Again: 'The Fruits of the Spirit are not abstract virtues: *Gal.* v, 22, is distilled from an abundance of concrete examples such as the Syllabus quotes. It is obscured if we repeat glibly the list of "fruits of the Spirit" without thinking of practical instances in the New Testament or in our own experience, and admire men and women who exhibit faith, courage, courtesy and the rest without remembering the source of these qualities. The spirit and manners of a gentleman are acquired not by assiduous imitation, but by frequent intercourse with those who possess them. Companionship with Jesus Christ in thought and prayer is the only secret of the Christian character which these passages illustrate' (p. 274).

Commenting on *Matt.* vi, 9, of prayer it is said:

> 'What boys and girls need most is not simply to be familiarized with particular prayers . . . but to be taught *how to pray*, with minds fixed first of all upon God and His Kingdom, and hearts open to the claims and needs of others. For that reason corporate prayers in school are so vital a part of religious education . . . For that reason, too, boys and girls should not be allowed to suppose that a full and healthy Christian life can be lived apart from the fellowship of the Church in worship and service' (p. 250).

Of the theology of the book it may be said that it is altogether sane and liberal, positive and abreast of the times. Questions like that of

miracles (p. 21 ff. and Indices) are fairly and wisely treated, due weight being given both to the Scriptural basis, to the findings of scholarship and to modern science of all types.

> 'The important thing is neither to assume that every miracle can be rationalized, *i.e.* explained away, nor to suppose that belief in God's power as beyond our comprehension necessitates the literal acceptance of every miracle in every detail. Theologians no longer maintain that the divinity of Jesus is proved by His working of miracles, but rather that a personality uniquely one, as His was, with God, man and Nature may well achieve what no other human being has wrought, as He in fact did' (p. 32).

For references to the Incarnation, Atonement, Phophecy, *Kiddûsh* and other major topics, the Indices should be consulted.

The Handbook has excellent Indices: references are made copiously throughout to books, good, cheap and up-to-date, by first-class scholars, for further information and views. It might have been even more helpful if a chronological table of events, personalities and writings of different countries in parallel columns had been included. This Handbook should be invaluable, not only to all teachers, but also to clergy and to general readers who wish to study the Bible and their religion systematically and with a little care. Every Ordinand should possess it.

Presumably, on p. 263, 'Diocletian' is an error for 'Domitian' as the Emperor under whom Revelation was written.

W. RICHARDSON.

PRAYERS IN WAR-TIME*

Here are five short books of prayers — three specially composed for war-time, and three for more general use. Canon Cockin in his Foreword to *Praying in War-Time* emphasizes

> 'Our first duty is to *learn* to pray. And that means, among other things, discovering what we should, and what we should not, pray for.'

His discovery is expounded in four chapters:

I Praying in Christ's Name!
II Praying for Protection;
III Praying for Victory;
IV Praying for our Enemies.

He defines prayer in Christ's name as trying to offer the kind of prayers to which Christ could put His name, and says:

> 'To pray according to the mind of Christ means to pray with the vision of Christ triumphant. . . . We cannot have the vision unless we

* *Praying in War-Time*, by F. A. Cockin. (*War-Time Discussions*, S.C.M. Press, 1940. Price 9*d*.)
War-Time Intercessions, by the Rev. G. Lacey May. (Skeffington, 1940, 2/6.)
A Pocket-Book of Prayers, by Geoffrey H. Woolley, V.C., M.C., M.A. (S.C.M. Press, 1940, 1/- net.)
Vision, Work, Service, by Reginald W. Wilde, M.A., B.Sc. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1940, 3/6.)
Jubilate Deo, by Lionel James. (Oxford University Press, 1940, 2/-.)

> are ready to share the cost of it: but we cannot share the cost of it save *in the power of the vision*' (p. 23; my italics.)

It is, however, in the difference of the vision which is granted to each of us at varying ages that the difficulty of praying truly in Christ's name lies. Yet this book is a practical guide for every kind of parish. Each chapter gives questions for discussion, and prayers with exhortations which worshippers in church and at home may share.

War-Time Intercessions, arranged and compiled by the Rev. G. Lacey May, are also for congregational or private use. There are nine forms of intercession, each commencing with a silence and a 'guiding thought.' Seven of these thoughts are the consecutive sentences of the Lord's Prayer. Form VIII is based upon the Prayer-Book Litany, the ninth upon the Prayer-Book Collects. Then comes a concluding form, '(For the use of those who prefer longer silences).'

> 'The essence of intercession is not speech, but the upholding before God and to His mercy those for whom the intercessor desires to pray. . . .'

This form of service mentions 'in turn the different needs to be presented in silence to the throne of grace before being summed up in a versicle and a response.' We quote the seventh need:

> 'Remember all who serve these great hosts of combatants and sufferers: chaplains, doctors, nurses, workers for home defence or for the comforts and good cheer of the troops. Pray that all this service may be offered in a Christian spirit, and not for vainglory or from covetousness.
>
> *Silence.*
>
> O Lord, hear our prayer,
> *And let our cry come unto Thee.*'

While some leaders of these intercessions may prefer to shorten or amend the connecting exhortations, Mr. Lacey May is to be congratulated on re-presenting to us in helpful fashion much of the wealth of our English Prayer-Book.

Briefest of these collections is Geoffrey H. Woolley, V.C., M.C., M.A.'s *A Pocket-Book of Prayers* — 'for those on active service and for those at home.' As the publishers describe it,

> 'This is a book of daily prayers for men in the Services, compiled by one who knows from experience the tests and temptations of war.'

It deserves particular recommendation to everyone, including civilians in the front line, whose hours of duty render them so fatigued that single sentences of prayer and Christian thought clustered on a page serve them best. After groups of prayers for the morning and shorter ones for the evening, such as this,

> TUESDAY EVENING.
>
> For the Navy Army and Air Force.

For all children, that they may be healthy, happy and well educated.
For yourself: *Purity and self-control.*

Save us, O Lord, waking, and guard us sleeping, that awake we may watch with Christ, and asleep we may rest in peace,'

there are selected passages of Scripture and 'Prayers for others.' This 'pocket-book' has already proved itself the very thing for the badly wounded, and will enable them to maintain or re-develop regular habits of spiritual devotion.

For that purpose, we take next *Vision, Work, Service,* by Reginald W. Wilde, M.A., B.Sc. It is a thoroughly compiled programme of meditation and prayer, giving two full pages for each day of the month; and appended are two schemes of self-examination, with four and a half pages of the author's sources of quotations, plus all his acknowledgements. The quotations are arranged on the first page for each day, followed by the page of prayers composed by the author himself.

'Enable me this day to serve Thee in reality and in truth. May my religion be a real thing, and my service of Thee a whole-hearted service. As now I pray to Thee, may I, in the hours that lie before me, translate my prayer into deed.'

In his Preface he writes:

'Moreover, the Christian's task in war-time is not essentially different from that in peace. His calling is still to cherish and serve and conserve as much as ever possible of Christian values. Doubtless, that is a far harder thing in war than in peace; but it is essentially the same task. And it is this task of serving and extending Christian values which forms the "motif" of this little book.'

For Schools, however, we recommend *Jubilate Deo,* now issued in its third edition. Mr. Lionel James' work is no doubt already well known to many users. Its contents are so numerous and varied, though compact, that those to whom it is new will welcome the 'suggestions as to use.' There are Prayers for the six days of the week, for Special Occasions, for Special Objects, Thanksgivings, 'Some Homely Prayers,' and a Calendar of Days of Remembrance. In two Appendices are Prayers for use in a Boarding House, and this from the Prayers of Warren Hastings:

'Grant, O Lord, that we may keep a constant guard upon our thoughts and passions, that they may never lead us into sin; that we may live in perfect charity with all mankind, in affection to those that love us, and in forgiveness to those, if any there are, that hate us. Give us good and virtuous friends. In the name of our blessed Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.'

Elsewhere we are given Nelson's prayer written in his diary on board the 'Victory' after signal had been made to bear down upon the French and Spanish fleets:

'May the Great God, whom I worship, grant to my country, and for the benefit of Europe in general, a great and glorious victory; and

may no misconduct in anyone tarnish it; and may humanity after victory be the predominant feature in the British fleet! For myself, I commit my life to him that made me, and may his blessing alight on my endeavours for serving my country faithfully! To him I resign myself, and the just cause which is intrusted to me to defend. Amen, Amen, Amen.'

W.T.A.P.

FATHERS AND HERETICS*

It is no easy matter to produce a readable book on patristic theology — something which will both interest and instruct an educated Christian reader who has had no theological training. A. V. G. Allen achieved it in his *Continuity of Christian Thought*, as also did Edwin Hatch in his *Influence of Greek Ideas* and Charles Bigg in his *Christian Platonists of Alexandria*. J. H. Newman was less successful in his attempts.

To combine the dogmatic thought very closely with its historic background and with the personalities of the theological protagonists and their opponents is the best way of securing the attention of the reader. This is the way which Dr. G. L. Prestige has pursued in his *Fathers and Heretics*, the Bampton Lectures for 1940.

The eight lectures cover the evolution of Christian Theology during its first four centuries and are particularly concerned with the great Conciliar Period. The lectures are entitled:

(1) Tradition: or, The Scriptural Basis of Theology: A Prologue.
(2) Callistus: or, Faith in a Divine Saviour.
(3) Origen: or, The Claims of Religious Intelligence.
(4) Athanasius: or, The Unity of God.
(5) Apollinaris: or, Divine Irruption.
(6) Nestorius: or, Redeemed Humanity.
(7) Cyril: or, One Lord, One Faith, One Baptism.
(8) Eros: or, Devotion to the Sacred Humanity: An Epilogue.

The Epilogue, as is natural, strays in a most interesting way down into the Scholastic Period.

Dr. Prestige is immensely readable. His style is too cultured to be called journalistic, but it is deliberately impressionist. He is resolved to attract and interest in order to convert and inspire. Dr. Prestige is a Christian Apologist, or perhaps some would prefer to say a Catholic Apologist; Dr. Prestige does not himself forget it, although the brilliancy, humour, and many-sided erudition of his lectures tend to conceal it. Above all, Dr. Prestige is a Bampton Lecturer, and he is loyal to the purpose of that foundation.

* *Fathers and Heretics*: The Bampton Lectures for 1940. By G. L. Prestige, D.D. (S.P.C.K. 12*s*. 6*d*. 1940.)

The besetting temptation of the Apologist is to ignore scientific method if it does not suit his apologetic purpose. We think that Dr. Prestige succumbs to this in some measure in the selection of his materials. Where the mass of his materials is so great, he must, of course, select. Also, had he selected for incorporation into his lectures materials which were not in harmony with his apologetic aim, he might have found himself involved in difficulties and problems which the limitations of public delivery would not have permitted him to solve even in a university pulpit.

As a consequence the critic feels at times that although Dr. Prestige, like a good apologist, tells the truth and nothing but the truth, yet he does not tell the whole truth; and had he told the whole truth, this would on occasions have necessitated a somewhat different conclusion from that which he presents to his readers.

Particularly is this so when he is arguing the case for Tradition in his Prologue. Archbishop Cranmer, Christian, Catholic and Humanist, would have had something to say here which Dr. Prestige has omitted. To take another example — Hippolytus seems to us to have been very unjustly treated by Dr. Prestige in comparison with the favour shewn to the morally dubious Callistus.

Hippolytus like Tertullian and the whole succession of Montanist, Novationist, Donatist, Puritan Rigorists of the second, third and fourth centuries, in protesting vigorously against the relaxation of the Primitive Church discipline, possessed a very strong case. Must not the relaxation of discipline lead to the lowering of both Christian ideals and practice? Was not such relaxation, a cowardly concession to popular feelings, really more pagan than Christian at heart? The indulgence of Callistus was as logically as it was morally weak. The defenders of Callistus may plead: 'The love of Christ constraineth us,' but in that case ought there to have been any church discipline at all? Christ is reported as saying in the Fourth Gospel — perhaps an echo of the Parable of the Prodigal Son — 'him that cometh unto Me I will in no wise cast out' (*John* vi, 37).

Had Callistus stood for the abolition of the ecclesiastical administration of Church discipline, on the ground that such discipline should be alone exerted by the moral and spiritual tone of the Christian community which would make it impossible for those who were not loyal to its life to abide in its society — 'They went out from us because they were not of us: had they been of us they would doubtless have continued with us' (I *John* ii, 19) — he would have been taking a line demanding immense courage indeed, but also at the same time commanding our respect. As it was, his policy seems to us to deserve all that Hippolytus and Tertullian said in its condemnation. But this aspect of the case is not treated by Dr. Prestige.

To take another example belonging to the same locality and the same

period, we find Dr. Prestige's treatment of Roman Adoptionism very one-sided. That is not because he refers to only one Theodotus, the banker; and omits Theodotus, the shoemaker. It is because he gives the impression that Adoptionism was a novel introduction into the Christology of the Roman Church. We know that it was asserted in refuting it that such was the case, but it is more than doubtful whether this is historically sound. Is there not much to be said for the view that the primitive Roman Christology was implicitly, if not explicitly, Adoptionist? Does not the earlier date which modern scholars assign to *The Pastor* of Hermas support this view?

Indeed we find this one-sidedness extends to the whole of Dr. Prestige's treatment of Adoptionism. His treatment is aptly summed up in the sentence:

> 'Adoptionism was hated because it was so plainly incompatible with the Gospel' (p. 160).

Now it is true that Adoptionism was inadequate theologically, but historically it represented a sincere effort to be true to certain facts in the Synoptic Gospels. Also it would appear to have been the Christology of the primitive Church at Jerusalem, as evidenced by certain of St. Peter's utterances preserved in the earlier chapters of the *Acts of the Apostles*. But Dr. Prestige seems to ignore this and much else which might be urged in palliation of it. To say of it:

> 'At this disparagement of the Redeemer the gorge of Christendom rose in protest;' . . .
>
> 'Adoptionism, right or wrong, was certainly not Christianity' (p. 158).

fails to do justice to a very primitive and popular Christology.

This failure to do full justice to the heretics, mainly by silence, is, we venture to think, the weak side of these Lectures; and as a consequence, a reader of them who has some acquaintance with the historical background of the periods treated in them will find himself more often interested, even intrigued, than convinced.

We turn now to the more favourable impression which these Lectures make. Dr. Prestige in a religious age which is unhappily marked by the flight from Reason, is himself a stout Rationalist. Reason will not betray its loyalist, and we hope that Dr. Prestige will live long enough to see Reason's deserters come 'meekly stealing' back into the rational fold.

Again, Dr. Prestige is a sound Catholic. We use Catholic here with no prefixes and with no inverted commas. His Catholicism is not Roman nor Anglo nor Neo, etc. A fine example of it is seen in his account of Catholic ideals and practice in contrast with those of the best pagan philosophical and mystical religions on the one hand, and the aberrations of the noblest Christian heretics on the other.

One of the most valuable sections in his lectures from the modern point of view is the account which Dr. Prestige gives of Origen's educational system. That system was amazingly broad-based and practical. It aimed at the all-round intellectual, moral and spiritual development of the student. Physical science, philosophic speculation, classical literature and the Holy Scriptures were its main bases; but study was not divorced from practice. The formation of character and the development of the best methods of living the good life went hand in hand with teaching and study, and Origen himself constituted the ever-present example of what his methods could effect. The course lasted five years as described by one of the most devoted of Origen's students. John Milton, the educationist, although no lover of patristics might have had Origen's system in mind when he wrote:

> 'How charming is divine philosophy,
> not harsh and crabbed as dull fools suppose,
> but musical as is Apollo's lute.'

Tutors in our Theological Colleges and, above all, the Church authorities who prescribe study-courses for Ordinands, might do well to translate Origen's educational ideals and methods into modern practice.

Another valuable feature of Dr. Prestige's lectures is to be found in his philological notes. They justify his reputation as a Patristic Greek Lexicographer.

We venture, in conclusion, on one or two queries rather than corrections. We wonder if *paradidomi* may not point to the Baptist's betrayal by a false disciple, or to his being handed over by a Roman procurator to Herod Antipas. Dr. Prestige, referring to the well-known *graffito* of Alexamenos, writes:

> 'The sting of the caricature lies in the assumption, not that the God only, but that His worshipper, was an ass' (p. 85).

That assumption requires that the *orans* should be depicted with an ass's head, but if we recollect rightly, he is not. Moreover, the ass's head of the figure on the Cross may not be intended to portray the stupidity of the God but to indicate that he was Jewish. Josephus was at much pains to correct the Pagan slander that the original Deity of the Jews was a wild ass.

We are grateful to Dr. Prestige for his stimulating and in some ways provocative volume, and not one of the least reasons for our gratitude is that its author is not only a good rationalist and a sound Catholic, but also a promising Modernist. For example, in writing of Christological development, he truly points out:

> 'Although Christians called Him from the first by the divine name of Lord, some time elapsed before the instinct of devotion, which recognized in Christ the Wisdom of God and the Power of God, the First-Born of creation and the heavenly High Priest, could reconcile the fundamental monotheism of His disciples with the stirring of their

hearts that bade them hail Him as their God. It was still longer before theology succeeded in working out a rational statement of all the implications of His deity: some aspects of that work still wait for satisfactory fulfilment' (p. 86).

There is no thoughtful Christian Modernist who does not feel the need to which our author refers. We could wish that Dr. Prestige himself would undertake this difficult task. H.D.A.M.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman*

SACRAMENTAL RELIGION AND THE ENGLISH LAITY.

SIR,

Your observations on the growing sacramentalism of the clergy should be read in conjunction with Mr. Hardwick's article in the same issue of the *Modern Churchman,* which throws a flood of light on the subject.

If it be true — and I doubt it — that 'our English folk are not sacramentalist in their religion,' then this is wholly a defect in them, since the only practical alternative to a sacramental religion is 'a dry clatter of morality.' But there is reason and justice in your complaint against sacramentalism if the Holy Eucharist is wrongly regarded as the End of the Christian Religion and not what our Lord intended it to be — a means of grace for the attainment of the End.

The *Alpha* of our Christian Religion is Conversion, to be effected by the proclamation of the Word; it is 'the Beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God.' The *Omega* is our final Sanctification; it is 'the End of your faith, even the salvation of your souls.' But between the Beginning and the End there lies a vast disputed field, cluttered with the wreckage of centuries of ecclesiastical warfare, on which men of good-will now seek in vain for Reunion on such matters as Episcopacy, Sacraments, Liturgies and Creeds.

The signs of the times call for a general retreat from this scene of strife and a general recall to the *Alpha* and *Omega* of our Christian Faith. The sacraments will then be understood and accepted for what they really are — means towards the final sanctification of redeemed and instructed Christians. Sacramentalism is perverted when it is made to do duty for the whole of Religion; as a system it utterly fails when it is regarded as the means both of Conversion and Sanctification. But for those who have been converted and taught by the message of the Gospel, the Holy Eucharist will be as salt in their mouths, giving them that divine thirst which cannot be satisfied until they attain to the *Omega* of their faith — the Beatific Vision of God, which alone is the *Summum Bonum* of the Christian Life. It is not the Mass that matters, but Eternal Life.

St. Barnabas' Vicarage,
Worcester. W. E. J. LINDFIELD.

[We are in hearty agreement with much that Mr. Lindfield writes, but are compelled to question his statement: 'If it be true — and I doubt it — that our English folk are not sacramentalist in their religion, then this is wholly a defect in them.' Without questioning for one moment

the value of sacramental practices for some English Christians, we do doubt the value for many English people of a form of Christianity which stresses the Sacraments as essentials and teaches that those who do not use them are not true Christians. The Christian life and spirit of the Quakers is a standing denial of this point of view.

Our Saviour in contrast to His Church would seem to have put extraordinarily little emphasis on the use of the Sacraments. It is almost certain that Christ did not institute Baptism. Had he done so as is stated in *Matthew* xxviii, 19, could St. Paul have written to the Corinthian Christians: 'Christ sent me not to baptise but to preach the Gospel' (I *Cor.* i, 17)? Nor would St. Peter have needed a divine vision to prepare him for the Baptism of Cornelius and his friends if he had known the command of Christ to baptise all nations.

In the case of the Eucharist, although the historical evidence is strong for holding that at the Last Supper Christ said of the Bread: 'This is my body,' and of the wine: 'This is my blood'; yet the true text of the Gospels does not contain the command to make the Eucharist a Christian institution (see Sanday, *Outlines of the Life of Christ,* pp. 157-169). It was probably the Apostles, and not the Saviour who made the Eucharist a Church institution. If this be so, are we justified in saying that the religion of Jesus Christ Himself is 'a dry clatter of morality'?—Ed. *M.C.*]

'GIVE IT THEM BACK.'

Sir,

I was very glad to read, in your January issue, your editorial remarks headed 'Give it them back,' with their reference also to the expressed opinion of the Bishop of Coventry on the question of retaliation for indiscriminate bombing. (Incidentally, by a verbal paradox, it is not really fully indiscriminate until it is discriminate — until, *e.g.* the Houses of Parliament, St. Paul's, Buckingham Palace, and Windsor Castle are deliberately picked out for destruction.)

I have always thought the subject has failed to receive the clear thinking it demands. 'Reprisals' here are not at all a matter of vindictive retaliation but of legitimate self-defence. Simply because there is as yet no other adequate defence against night bombing. In law, the right of self-defence extends to the taking of human life when no lesser measure can suffice; and morality has always recognized the rightness of this. It was with dismay that I heard, before wholesale bombing by the enemy had really begun in this country, a pronouncement on the wireless that we should in no circumstances retaliate. It was a blunder in all the categories, including the moral and psychological, and was, I have always felt, largely responsible for what followed in this sort. Few in this country, I believe (and certainly I am not one of them), advocate the deliberate bombing of civilian life and property. But it is not a case of that. It is a case of the inescapable margin of error involved in aiming at military objectives closely intermixed with others non-military. The Germans claim that civilian casualties and damage inflicted in this country have been due to this margin of error. Our proper course was surely to reply, 'Very well, we will also aim at any and every military objective we can locate in Berlin and other cities,' and to do so as long as they did, in Berlin, but more so on their nearer cities — thus inducing, ἐν παρέργῳ, some internal (and wholly salutary) dissension amongst the enemy: 'It's all very well, you bomb London, but it's *we* who get it back.'

All this would be entirely rightful self-defence. And it would not be asking our airmen to bomb civilians. What we have actually said — and done, until perhaps recently — merely encouraged the Germans in ruthlessness.

There is also, I think, another point which has not been properly seized. The bombing of capital cities should rank in a category by itself. Military effect is not the only one to be considered here (a fact already recognized in the abstension from bombing Paris, though for other reasons). 'London can take it,' but if we can, by widespread military bombing in Berlin (or even Hamburg), save her, it is a duty to do so. We do not save her by concentrating on general objectives which we should be attacking in any case. Moral factors are involved here, not only military. But you, sir, have excellently indicated in outline the true position on this theme in general.

D. G. DAVIES.

Bletchington Rectory,
Oxford.
January 25th, 1941.

PACIFISM.

SIR,

Dr. C. J. Wright's review of Jessop's *Law and Love* moves me to offer you another quotation on Pacifism from the same book. It is condensed from pp. 153-4.

> 'The question is not whether if we fight we shall go to heaven or not, but whether if we do not fight, Christianity will remain on earth. Is evil to have the monopoly of efficacy? Or are the oppressed to go on suffering because we love the oppressor more practically than we love *them*? War can be right not because it can convert the enemy, but because it can protect his victims. When we cannot do both, must we do neither? Pacifism may result in giving *Love* no opportunity to *do* anything.'

Even better, to my mind, is Dr. Edwyn Bevan in *Christians in a World at War* (S.C.M., 1940).

T. F. ROYDS.

Haughton Rectory,
Stafford.

SONGS OF PRAISE.

SIR,

The letter from Mr. E. V. Milner about the verse of a hymn of which Dr. Dearmer disapproved reminds me of a correspondence I once had with Dr. Dearmer about another hymn in his collection. This is taken from Browning's poem *Johannes Agricola in Meditation*. I was so amazed to find it in any volume of hymns to be sung in church that I ventured to ask him how such a thing had come about. For answer he told me that I would 'find this explained a little' in his book *Songs of Praise Discussed*, which as it happened was just beng published. I did get a copy of that extraordinarily interesting book, but I must confess I do not think the explanation which he gives is entirely satisfactory, and I often wonder what Robert Browning, who represents Agricola as such an extremely smug person, would have thought of it.

ROBERTA GLASGOW.

Birkenhead.
Feb. 9th, 1941.